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0 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between contested judicial elections and the value 
of total damages in product liability trials. For years, legal scholars have argued that 
judicial elections pose a direct threat to a judge's impartiality, but this thesis is one of 
only a few studies to observe judicial elections' quantitative effects on the application 
of law. Narrowing the focus of this thesis to a set of particularly competitive California 
Superior Court elections in 1982, this thesis evaluates judicial behavior through 
difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) analysis. The major findings of this study are as 
follows: 1) Controlling for relevant variables, contested judicial elections are associated 
with a statistically significant increase in product liability awards stemming from 
Californian jury trials. 2) I conclude that legal economists must tailor empirical analysis 
to the practical as well as institutional incentive structures facing elected judges. 3) 
Finally, I suggest a theoretical model of judicial vote-maximization to inform future 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Introduction 
 
 
This paper is concerned with the relationship between contested judicial elections 
and the value of tort awards within product liability cases in the United States. More 
specifically, this study seeks to observe whether major players in the tort industry, trial 
attorneys and corporate defendants, can influence the course of civil proceedings through 
traditional rent-seeking in state judicial elections. This topic has important economic and 
legal implications. Since the 1980s, the role of the tort system in the United States' 
economy has been increasing in both scope and scale. According to Viscusi et al. (1993), 
the value of general liability claims arising from tortious malfeasance has sextupled 
between 1975 and 1988. Presently, Rubin (2005) estimates that the tort system now 
consumes over $233 billion per year, or 2.2% of GDP as of 2002. At this size, the U.S. 
tort industry features many well established players that use a variety of tools to diminish 
costs and maximize profit. 
 
This study seeks to integrate analysis of judicial decision-making into the larger 
economic debate surrounding tort law. As a result, the structure of this paper is as 
follows. First, I examine previous literature on the subject of tort law and explain its 
shortcomings with respect to the role of judges. Second, I outline the data and 
methodology I use to analyze this research question. Third, I discuss the implications and 
limitations of my results, and finally, I point to future avenues of research in the 
economic analysis of judicial elections 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
In order to weigh the effect of rent-seeking in judicial elections on tort awards, 
this section presents the traditional framework used by previous economists in 
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 considering the tort system. The role of judges has largely been neglected in modern 
theoretical considerations, and empirical investigations into the tort system are 
noticeably absent. I seek to expand both over the course of this thesis. 
 
The discussion of the economic effects of legal systems has appeared only recently in 
academic research. Early analyses on legal economic efficiency compared different types of 
legal systems altogether. More specifically, researchers sought to compare the British 
common law system, which relies on binding written precedent and broad judicial power, to 
Latin Civil Law, ecclesiastical law, and even socialist conceptions of law. These earlier 
researchers emphasize a legal system's ability to push governing rules and procedures 
towards efficiency. Priest (1977) argues that common law systems are efficient because 
unclear and inefficient legislative rules are theoretically more likely to compel litigation. 
This attribute forces judges to give more precise and predictable rulings, resulting in 
increased efficiency through binding precedent. Terrebonne (1981) suggests a critical model 
of efficient legal evolution. Empirically, Carlsson and Lunström (2002) find that common 
law zones face greater rates of growth in per capita income, more political freedom, greater 
adherence to the rule of law, and greater market allocation of goods through property rights 
when compared to other types of legal systems. These findings indicate a large consensus on 
the "macro" level 
 
efficiency of common law systems (Rubin 2005).1 
 
More recently, however, research has gravitated towards "micro" level rules 
within the common law system that could affect social welfare. Within this "micro" level 
 
1
 See also, Scully (1992); Elliot (1985); Zywicki (2003). In particular, Zywicki argues that, historically, 
when litigants have a choice among several different common law systems, such as royal law vs. 
mercantile law or more recently state courts vs. federal courts, administrators face greater incentives to 
provide efficient contract and commercial laws. He calls this the "supply side" aspect to legal 
administration. 
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 of analysis, researchers can find the economic analysis of tort law. Landes & Posner 
(1982) posit a "positive economic theory of tort law," where tort law exists as a means 
to force producers to internalize social costs associated with product liability, medical 
malpractice, and other fields where courts routinely delegate rulings within unlegislated 
elements of the legal system. In this sense, the authors argue, tort law is a system of 
Coasean bargaining that allows tortfeasors and injured parties to settle negative 
 
externalities arising from the consumption of goods and services.2 While this view of 
tort law certainly is plausible, it has come under significant scrutiny in recent years. 
According to Rubin (2005), an efficient tort system requires two characteristics. First, 
those who award tort damages (i.e., juries and judges) must be able to identify negative 
externalities and assign a monetary value to them. Second, these individuals must be 
willing to apply these measures of social cost to cases at hand. Under the framework of 
public choice, Rubin concludes, these outcomes seem very unlikely. Individuals that 
engage in strictly personal utility-maximizing behavior rarely have an interest to act in 
favor of public welfare; this is especially true within the field of tort law. 
 
In order to explain the importance of public choice theory to the execution of tort 
law, economists must give proper consideration to the relevant players at hand. Previous 
research studied the relationship between tort attorneys and their clients. Priest (1991) 
explains that tort systems derivative of British common law incorporate a necessary 
element of ambiguity in its language as it appears in a state or country's system of rules. 
In the U.S. until the 1990s, legislatures have had neither the resources nor the willpower 
to specify the meaning of obscure legal terminology. As a result, legislatures often leave 
 
2
 Tort law only applies to injuries that courts can ascribe a monetary value. Landes & Posner (1982) warn 
that it does not address higher questions of justice, such as imprisonment for a crime. 
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 the precise meaning of these terms to be decided by courts through written precedent. 
Over time, this results in wide variation in the meaning of these rules across state lines, 
and consequently, attorneys organize around these interstate differentials to maximize 
their chances of winning and receiving large sums of cash. Utilizing the tools of common 
law, such as the class action lawsuit, attorneys play a significant role in matching large 
pools of lawsuits with favorable tort jurisdictions (Rubin 2005). In this respect, plaintiffs 
face a classic principal-agent problem. The interests of the utility-maximizing attorney, 
whose goal is to extract income from clients in the form of attorney's fees, does not 
always align with those of the people he or she represents. This results in areas within the 
United States that experience a disproportionate amount of litigation. The American Tort 
Reform Association has identified these districts as "judicial hellholes" (ATRA 2014). 
 
 
On the other side of these strings of litigation are corporate entities and medical 
practitioners. Vulnerable as defendants to liability arising out of faulty production 
processes, negligent designs, or malpractice, these individuals have an incentive to 
minimize the amount of money they pay to plaintiffs through two major tools. First, they 
can pursue a strategy similar to plaintiff attorneys, disputing the validity of accused torts 
through litigation. According to Epstein (1988), Curran (1992), and Rubin (2005), this 
decision is unlikely to yield its intended result. Plaintiff attorneys choose where to file 
their lawsuits, and this gives them the advantage of picking a county and court that will 
be most sympathetic to their claims. As a result, Rubin (2005) concludes tort attorneys 
have a comparative advantage in litigation, forcing firms to minimize vulnerability 
through rent-seeking. More specifically, corporate entities actively engage in state 
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 politics to elect individuals that pass statutory limits on tort awards through legislation 
(Browne & Puelz 1999). The result has been a surge in recent decades of corporate 
involvement in state elections and so-called "tort reforms." 
 
Thus, most existing literature has revolved around the distribution of power 
between plaintiff attorneys, who wish to extract wealth from firms through litigation, 
and defendants, who wish to avoid costly litigation through more traditional lobbying 
efforts. Browne & Puelz (1999) find that these statewide statutory reforms effectively 
reduce both a plaintiff's expected income from auto-accident litigation as well as the 
probability that a plaintiff will file a claim at all. Avraham (2007) replicated these results 
in the medical malpractice industry. 
 
Noticeably absent, however, is the role of a third and most likely equally 
important player: the judge. Under the common law system, judges in the United States 
retain broad latitude to limit the size of tort awards, in the form of punitive, economic, 
and non-economic damages (Champagne 2005). Additionally, they can use the position 
to influence the types of evidence a jury is permitted to hear. One example is the 
collateral source rule, which if enforced, forbids defense attorneys from presenting 
evidence of alternative methods of recourse that a plaintiff has received for a tort outside 
of trial, such as contractual worker's compensation (Browne & Puelz 1999). As such, 
both plaintiffs and defendants have a substantial interest in swaying the opinion of a 
judge. 
 
Recent literature has only skimmed the surface of the incentives that influence the 
behavior of judges. Differing institutions for the appointment of judges complicates the 
subject even more. Epstein et al. (2013) explain that predicting the behavior of judges 
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 appointed by executives and confirmed by legislatures is exceedingly difficult. Given the 
fact that appointed judges face no risk of losing their job as a result of "good behavior" 
tenure, their rulings tend to vary unpredictably along political, emotional, and 
circumstantial lines. However, Shepard (2013) notes that over 90% of tort cases in the 
United States appear before some kind of elected judge. Furthermore, Champagne (2005) 
finds that corporate expenditures on judicial elections have been increasing in the second 
half of the twentieth century. Clearly the behavior of elected judges should not be 
ignored by students of tort reform. 
 
Despite these findings, the impact of greater involvement in judicial elections is 
presently unclear. Public choice theory suggests that elected judges, concerned about 
securing reelection, must consider campaign prospects when rendering a decision. 
Similarly, corporate players, which have much to lose from an expensive tort system, 
should organize resources and lobbying efforts to elect sympathetic judges in tandem 
with existing efforts to influence state legislatures. Shepard (2013) concludes that elected 
judges on the appellate level are much more likely to rule in favor of business litigants in 
business-related cases. While this study supports the general conclusions of public choice 
models, Shepard's findings omit any data concerning state courts at the lowest level, 
where judges and juries determine the initial level of tort damages. Researchers must 
analyze the role of these judges because these individuals oversee the vast majority of 
tort cases. Furthermore, CJAC (1998) found that plaintiff attorneys dominate campaign 
finance donation within Californian Superior Courts. Therefore, empirical research can 
determine whether these various lobbying efforts have resulted in their 
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 intended effects. Only then can economists hope to integrate the role of judges into the 
greater dynamics of tort reform theory. 
 
Methodology 
 
Scope 
 
The central concern facing researchers of judicial behavior is the intrinsic 
problem of isolating the actions of judges among the multitude of other variables that 
factor into the amount of money transferred from a tortfeasor to a successful plaintiff. 
The final value of a tort award represents not only the summation of expenses 
experienced by a plaintiff, but also the subtle influences of judges and attorneys in the 
presentation and interpretation of evidence. Consequently, such behavior, by its nature, is 
difficult to quantify. This thesis proceeds on the notion that elected judges, in the name of 
self-preservation, consider the relevant effects of their decisions on campaign prospects 
in addition to their normal duties and, thus, behave accordingly. 
 
As such, an understanding of the incentive structures facing judges is essential to 
explaining their behavior. In the broadest sense, incentives should vary with the 
institutional mechanisms of each state. Theoretically, a judge from Delaware, where 
judges are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state assembly, should face 
very different circumstances than, for example, an elected judge from Alabama. From 
this perspective, a methodological framework that compares judges state-by-state seems 
like the logical choice. However, the practical realities of judicial electioneering make 
such a model ill-suited for valid empirical analysis. While the vast majority of states 
incorporate some form of electioneering into judicial selection, not all lower level judges 
face a serious threat from competitive candidates during election season. Therefore, a 
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 model that only addresses differences along state lines could face potential bias 
from elected judges that are not constrained by political considerations. 
 
To address this concern, this thesis narrows its scope to observations that take 
place within a single state's borders. This distinction allows empirical analysis to account 
for differences between judges that face the potential risk of unemployment during 
elections and those that do not. Consequently, the state of California offers the ideal 
context to explore this nuance. Among the most active legal systems in the developed 
world, the California judiciary reflects a microcosm of the circumstances troubling the 
country's elected judges. For decades, researchers have expressed concern over the 
growing role of campaign contributions in Californian judicial elections, which are 
 
conducted every six years with a requirement of non-partisanship (CJAC 1998).3 
 
Furthermore, as one of the tort capitals of the country, California offers researchers the 
opportunity to reconcile developments in state judicial elections with trends in civil 
liability (ATRA 2014). 
 
Data Sources 
 
Data for this study originate from several remarkable sources. I received 
individual case data through the Jury Verdicts Database for Cook County, Illinois and All 
 
Counties in California, 1960-1984.4 Initially compiled by the RAND Corporation in 
1994, the dataset is available to the public through the National Archive of Criminal 
Justice Data, a branch of the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR). Each observation represents a civil lawsuit and indicates important 
 
3
 California law prohibits judicial candidates from formally declaring a political affiliation.   
4
 The original source of information, according to the publishers of the data, were two reputable court 
reporter publications. These private services compile important facts for a wide variety of cases across 
California, and, for a fee, they offer the data to practicing attorneys hoping to research successful litigation 
techniques (Dunworth and Pace 1994).  
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 quantitative variables, such as total damages (i.e., economic, non-economic, and punitive) 
awarded in trial, as well certain qualitative variables, such as case type and geographic 
location. Another important benefit to this dataset is that it identified the presiding judge 
in each case, which allowed me to isolate judicial performance over an extended period 
of time. 
 
With respect to judicial electioneering, I relied on two main sources. First was a 
campaign archive provided by the National Institute for Money in State Politics, a non-
partisan organization that tracks state-level campaign finance and competition. Equally 
important, however, was Kathy Morris Wolf's California Courts and Judge (1996). 
 
Although published in print, Wolf (1996) catalogues the career and election history of 
every California Superior Court judge over the past half-century. 
 
Model 
 
The model presented in this section seeks to interpret a comprehensive set of 
Californian trial data through difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) regression analysis. 
The diff-in-diff framework offers several important benefits to this study. First, it allows 
researchers to isolate the behavior of judges among a multitude of other variables that 
factor into a tort award. Second, because the diff-in-diff model tracks individual judges 
over time, the line of causality between contested judicial elections and jury awards is far 
easier to observe than, for example, a simple OLS regression. In this case, I am concerned 
with the treatment effect of competitive judicial elections on the dependent variable, 
product liability awards stemming from jury trials. To simulate an experimental setting, 
the treatment group is defined along the experience of Californian Superior Court judges 
between 1980 and 1983. In particular, I am interested in observing judicial 
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 behavior during the 1982 elections, an infamous year for electoral competition among 
electoral scholars (Wolf 1996). Cases tried before a judge that ran in a contested election 
during this time period are considered the treatment group. Similarly, cases that reached 
a verdict in front of judge that ran unopposed in 1982 are the control group. Fortunately, 
there is little reason to fear for a violation of the common trend assumption as broad, 
structural changes over time in the interpretation and administration of tort law only 
occur on the state level, which means, thanks to the common law system, that any of 
these changes in jurisprudence in higher courts will be reflected in both the control and 
test groups. 
 
Beyond that concern, this model adjusts for several important control variables. 
One of the primary determinants of the value of tort awards will naturally be the severity 
of the plaintiff's injury. Instead of listing all the possible harms that can affect an 
individual, this model employs the initial claim that the plaintiff, in consultation with his 
or her attorney, files with the court. This number will internalize the level of injury the 
plaintiff has sustained and state that injury in an easily interpreted dollar amount. One 
possible problem with using this term is the threat of omitted-variable bias. An attorney's 
valuation of a claim could, in theory, relate to certain unobservable characteristics, such 
as the character and demeanor of the judge. To address this problem, I have included 
several variables. First, I include the percent difference between the value of the final 
jury award and the claim. Second, the model incorporates the average product liability 
award historically given in front of each observed judge. Finally, I add time-constant 
fixed effects for each judge. Next, I include control variables for certain quantitative 
measures that are likely to increase the cost of trial and, therefore, the final verdict. 
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 These variables include the number of plaintiffs, the length of the trial measured in days, 
and a binary variable that equals 1 if the plaintiff requests the jury to consider the 
 
application of punitive damages.5 
 
Taking into account these variables, I have produced the following model, yi = 
β0 + δ0D81i + δ1D82i + δ2D83i + δ3(Treatmenti×D81i) + δ4(Treatmenti×D82i) + 
δ5(Treatmenti×D83i) + β1Treatmenti + β2Claimi + β3Plaintiffsi + 
 
β4PercentDifferencei + β5LengthofTriali + β6DPunitivei + αi + εi 
 
where (for observations i=1,..., k) yi equals the final value of product liability awards 
stemming from Californian jury trials. For all coefficients, I expect the sign to be 
positive. The testing period, which lasts from 1980 to 1983, is indicated by time-specific 
dummy variables. I include 1980 as the base year, 1981 as a pre-treatment period, as 
well as 1982 and 1983 as post-treatment periods. One important caveat to note is the 
limited predictive value of the diff-in-diff model. The purpose of this study is not to 
provide a definitive predictor of tort outcomes; rather, the goal is to isolate judicial 
 
agency among the many influences on jury verdicts.6 In this vein, the primary concern is 
the coefficient δ4, the average treatment effect. This model is designed the test the 
following null hypothesis: 
 
H0: δ4 = 0. 
 
 
In other words, the null hypothesis, which I intend to reject, states that during the 1982 
election year, holding all else constant, tort damages overseen by a judge facing a 
 
 
 
5
 Unfortunately, the data does not include the value of attorney's fees in each case.   
6
 In fact, an economic model that purports to predict tort litigation outcomes based on jury trials would be 
inherently misleading seeing as the vast majority of claims are settled out of court (Rubin 2005).  
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 contested judicial election on average do not differ significantly from damages under 
a judge running unopposed. 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
 
In accordance with the methodology outlined above, the final dataset includes 
702 product liability trials over the course of the four-year testing period. In each of these 
 
cases, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff and, consequently, awarded tort damages.7 
 
The summary statistics produced in Table 1 illustrate the high-risk nature of expensive 
and protracted product liability tort litigation. 
 
 Table 1. SummaryStatistics      
    Standard  
 Variable  Mean  Deviation  
 Jury Award $795,783.50 $4,064,492 
 D81 0.210177 0.4076597 
 D82 0.255531 0.4364007 
 D83 0.289823 0.4539312 
 (TreatmentxD81) 0.070797 0.2566265 
 (TreatmentxD82) 0.094027 0.2920272 
 (TreatmentxD83) 0.108407 0.311059 
 Treatment 0.357301 0.4794698 
 Claim $75,258.10 $266,403.50 
 Plaintiffs 1.314159 0.8183788 
 Percent Difference (%) 98.66544 2190.99 
 Average Award $335,333.28 $30,001.10 
 Length (days) 29.7906 17.7853 
 Punitive Damages      
 Requested 0.097345 0.2965912 
       
 
As indicated in the table, the average verdict surpasses three-quarters of $1 million.8 
 
Similarly, with an average length of approximately 30 days, these cases feature extended 
periods of intense litigation. An important feature to note is the Percent Difference variable. 
On average winning plaintiffs receive close to 100% more money than they 
 
7
 Because I am only concerned with the effect of judicial elections on the awards received by plaintiffs, 
I removed all cases that ruled in favor of the defendant.   
8
 However, one should note that with a standard deviation of $4.06 million, this distribution of jury 
awards skews significantly to the right.  
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 initially claimed in damages. Whether or not this large difference is due in part to 
judicial elections is the subject of the next section. 
 
Results 
 
 
The results of the diff-in-diff estimation are reported in Table 2. Reported 
alongside each estimated coefficient is the respective robust t-statistic to account for 
heteroskedasticity. I have included stars (*) to indicate each coefficient's significance 
level.9 As expected, the sign of the coefficient on Claim is positive and extremely 
Table 2. Estimates of the Empirical 
 Model              
          (I + Fixed    
   (I)    (II)    Effects)    
 Dep.Variable:JuryAward  Coefficient  t-ratio  Coefficient  t-ratio  Coefficient  t-ratio  
 D81 $62,214.64 0.23 $122,616.10 0.37 $17,59.01 0.18  
 D82 $233,874 0.90 $122,055.90 0.39 $115,805 1.47  
 D83 $325,112.80 1.27 $337,078.90 1.06 $166,686.50*** 2.10  
 (TreatmentxD81) $159,734.40 0.30 $149,777.60 0.25 $199,385.30 0.97  
 (TreatmentxD82) $1,025,280** 2.20 $1,637,941*** 2.95 $740,773** 1.99  
 (TreatmentxD83) -$47,731.12 -0.10 -$47,997.96 -0.09 $109,242.80 0.61  
 Treatment -$53,245.49 -0.16 $102,267 0.26 -147,202 -0.89  
 Claim $2.69*** 10.51 $2.56*** 7.33 $2.33*** 10.21  
 Plaintiffs -$12,991.82 -0.10 -$88,204.41 -0.57 -$9,334.83 -0.27  
 Percent Difference $13,803.19*** 12.14 - - $14,163.65 1.37  
 Average Award - - -$2.30 -0.63 - -  
 Length -$5,809.46 -1.31 -$3,254.87 -0.62 -$2,259* -1.68  
 Punitive Damages Requested $198,259.90 0.73 $64,763.80** 2.00 $267,874.20 1.06  
 Intercept $79,006.53 0.27 $263,114.50 0.73 -$1,734.10 -0.02  
 Adjusted R-squared 0.362   0.141   0.345    
 n 702   702   702    
               
 
significant. Interestingly enough, for every $1 of damages claimed, the plaintiff receives 
approximately $2.5 in awards, holding all else equal. This term suggests that plaintiffs 
during these extended periods of litigation reap a far higher award than their own original 
estimation of the tort. One possible explanation for this occurrence is the dollar value of 
 
9
 * for 10%; ** for 5%; and *** for 1%. Given the skewness of some variable distributions, I ran log-linear 
specifications for each iteration of the model. This did not affect the significance of any terms. Therefore, 
for the sake of convenient interpretation, I chose only to publish the original regression table. 
 
 
14 
 attorney's fees. Attorneys naturally play a large role in determining the initial claim as 
well as convincing the jury and judge to be sympathetic to their case. Thus, one would 
expect the absence of attorney's fees, which are reasonable replacements for attorney 
quality, would result in some bias in the coefficient on Claim. Nonetheless, given this 
coefficient's statistical significance and consistency over various iterations of the model, 
the claim seems to be an appropriate proxy for severity of injury. 
 
As discussed with the methodology of the study, the most important estimated 
parameter is the coefficient on (Treatment×D82). Across three different iterations of the 
model, the diff-in-diff regression has predicted a statistically significant positive average 
treatment effect. Ranging on average from approximately $750,000 to over $1.5 million, 
this treatment effect also implies extreme economic significance. Furthermore, the 
estimation fails to reject the null hypotheses on pre-period 1981 and post-period 1983 in 
the treatment group. This suggests that during the slew of contested judicial elections in 
1982, product liability plaintiffs received more favorable rulings from judges facing 
election than those who did not. Additionally, after the election, judicial behavior 
appears to have returned to pre-election levels. 
 
Finally, the significance of the control variables deserves brief discussion. 
Generally, these controls proved statistically insignificant on the final valuation of the 
jury award. This could be for several reasons. Most likely, these estimates suffer from 
omitted-variable bias. Some unobserved variable in the error term may skew the 
parameter away from its theoretically true value. Another plausible explanation is non-
linearity with the dependent variable. Some variables may still have a positive, but 
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 diminishing effect, on the jury award. Nonetheless, because these terms are merely 
controls and not the subject of this thesis, they hold little relevance to the final findings. 
 
Discussion 
 
Implications 
 
The diff-in-diff estimation suggests that during the 1982 contested elections, 
judges and juries awarded significantly higher damages to plaintiffs. After judges no 
longer face a serious threat, product liability awards appear to have returned to pre-
election levels, all else held equal. In light of previous scholarship, these results may 
seem counter-intuitive. After all, Rubin (2005) predicted that, given corporations' 
comparative advantage in rent-seeking, elected officials are generally more likely to favor 
defendants within the U.S. tort industry. Furthermore, Shepard (2013) found that 
appellate-level elected judges are more likely than appointed judges to rule in favor of 
businesses on business-related issues. Thus, the results of this study seem to conflict with 
these findings. 
 
However, if economists thoroughly consider the incentive structure facing trial 
judges during elections, they can see that my findings are sufficiently consistent with the 
higher body of literature. For example, CJAC (1998) illustrates the unique composition 
of state trial-level judicial elections. The report finds that during the last decades of the 
twentieth century, California Superior Court candidates on average raise 51% of 
campaign funds through their personal finances. The next biggest faction comes from 
attorneys, which comprise 49% of non-candidate contributions. Of this 49%, 64% 
identified as plaintiffs attorneys. Furthermore, the study shows that candidates who 
raised more money than opponents won their elections 87% of time. What this report 
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 shows is the fact that judicial campaigns attract participation from plaintiffs interested 
in high jury awards as well as defendants that favor toughness on torts. 
 
To illustrate this point, consider the following function: 
 
V = XUP(R(Q)) + YUD(R(Q)) + ZUC(R(Q)). 
 
Assume a judge oversees a case where various plaintiffs sue a defendant. This defendant is 
the producer of some good. In the equation above, V equals the number of votes a judge 
expects from his or her constituents during election times. The constituents are plaintiffs' 
attorneys (P), the defendant (D), and the represented plaintiffs (C). Each constituent's vote is 
determined by that individual's utility derived from perceived judicial performance (U), 
which is a function of the rent transfers resulting from tort litigation (R). As this is a wealth 
transfer, the rent must be a fraction of the consumer and producer surplus. Therefore, R must 
be a function of the defendant's income or simply its quantity of output in the market (Q). 
Finally, X, Y, and Z are constants that indicate the marginal effect of utility on judicial votes. 
I expect Y to be negative, because as L increases, 
 
defendant's utility will decrease and so will its likelihood to lobby in favor of a judge.10 
 
To maximize votes through the award of an optimal lawsuit, the judge under the public 
choice model must simply take the derivative of the function with respect to Q and set 
it equal to zero: 
dV/dQ = X(δUP/δQ) + Y(δUD/δQ) + Z(δUC/δQ) = 0. 
 
Thus, the optimal tort value for a judge (assuming a positive sign on Z) would 
occur when: 
 
X(δUP/δQ) + Z(δUC/δQ) = -Y(δUD/δQ).11 
 
 
 
11
 Because (δUD/δL) < 0, the right side of the equation will be a double negative. 
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 This equation demonstrates a simple comparison of marginal benefit (the left side) to 
marginal cost (the right side). The judge will raise the value of the tort award to benefit 
plaintiffs until the negative utility of defendants will reduce his or her net expected votes. 
The level of this raise depends on the relative magnitudes of X, Y, and Z. The larger the 
benefit for rewarding plaintiffs, more willing a judge is to penalize defendants, and vice 
 
versa.
12
 
 
Upon applying this explanation to an empirical analysis of the 1982 judicial 
elections, it is clear that the electoral influence of plaintiffs far outweighed that of 
defendants. This is observed through a positive average treatment effect. Conversely, in 
Shepard (2013), it may simply be the case that during the relevant time period, the 
influence of defendants outweighed those of plaintiffs, thus explaining the apparently 
conflicting findings of the two studies. Regardless of this fact, both of these studies 
conclude that in the face of competitive elections, vote-maximizing judges tend to alter 
their behavior to suit campaign prospects. 
 
Limitations 
 
Despite the major findings of this study, research into the role of judicial elections on 
state-level tort law is far from complete. Though moderately robust, the estimated average 
treatment effect presented in this paper should undergo further robustness testing to clarify 
its exact magnitude. This is aided only through more detailed and more comprehensive 
datasets. For example, studies must indicate what other factors could possibly influence the 
presence of contested judicial elections as well as the final value of 
 
 
12
 This mathematical model is an alteration of the popular rent-maximization model for elected officials, 
see Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974). In many respects, this model overstates the ability of judges to 
influence a tort award. However, it accurately relays, albeit simplistically, how an unbridled judge would 
respond to the incentive structure of an election. 
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 product liability awards. Furthermore, future studies, must delve deeper into the political 
composition of judicial elections. Empirical analysis should consider the influence that 
plaintiffs hold over a judge compared to defendants. Next, taking into account the 
practical composition of these elections (i.e., contested vs. uncontested), future research 
can then begin to conduct interstate analysis. That is, compare judges by institution type. 
Do retention vote states, such as Colorado, produce judges similar to appointment states, 
such as Alaska, or rather, are these judges closer to partisan elected judges (e.g., 
Louisiana)? Unfortunately, the present study cannot provide a sufficient answer. 
 
Finally, the findings of this study are limited to a very specific time period in the 
history of the United States. Since 1982, California has placed significant restrictions on 
its non-partisan judicial elections. For example, these restrictions include new 
developments in statutory tort reforms as well as more recent requirements for judges to 
recuse themselves in conflicts of interest (Abramson 1994). While this study supports the 
notion that judicial elections tend to operate under the umbrella of public choice 
economics, perhaps more recent developments can influence the exercise of a judge's 
rational choice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
For decades, legal scholars have warned the public of the danger judicial elections 
pose to impartiality in the administration of justice, but until recently, few researchers 
have actually tested this premise through the rigor of econometric analysis. By observing 
the role of the 1982 contested elections in California tort law, this thesis takes the first 
step in absorbing judicial decision-making into a higher body of debate in law and 
economics. Through difference-in-differences analysis, this study finds with statistical 
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significance that judges and juries on average tend to award higher damages to plaintiffs 
 
during contested judicial elections.  Furthermore, this thesis argues that a valid empirical 
 
analysis must first reflect the practical realities of judicial electioneering in addition to 
 
institutional structure.  Finally, I present a basic theoretical model of judicial vote- 
 
maximization that should serve to inform future inquiry.  While these results do not 
 
provide the definitive answer on judicial elections, they support the broad notion that 
 
when considering the relevant players in the formulation and execution of tort law, the 
 
incentives influencing judges are a crucial piece of information. 
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